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Preconstitutional Rules
RICHARD

S. KAY*

We are what iwe pretend to be, so we imitst be careful
be.'
about what ie pretend to

Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.

American constitutional law is founded upon a paradox. Constitutions
exist so that the activities of government may be defined, and therefore
limited, by law. To make those legal limits effective, they must be interpreted
and applied by an independent and authoritative Supreme Court. But the
Court is also an agency of government, and, as the final interpreter of the
constitutional rules, its authority is without enforceable legal limits. Thus, to
assure limited government, a locus of possibly unlimited government power
has been created.
It is not surprising that theoretical constitutional law scholarship has
focused, in large measure, on ways to define and control the institution of
judicial review. The problem is complicated by the recognition that, like any
center of great power, the Court may exercise, and has exercised, its authority to both good and ill effects. Academic efforts have, therefore, attempted to
prescribe "models" of review which preserve and strengthen the Court's
ability to contribute to society's well-being while reducing the possibility of
interference in areas where the participation of the judiciary adds nothing to
or subverts more appropriate methods of public decisionmaking. The two
books whose publication provides the occasion for this Symposium are in this
broad tradition of scholarship. Professor Choper asks what is "the proper role
of the Supreme Court in our representative democracy when the Court
engages in constitutional adjudication"? 2 Professor Ely offers a suggestion by
which the "dominant mode [of noninterpretivist judicial review) can be
improved upon ....
This language indicates that these authors are
engaged, not in description, but in argument. But argument is a useful exercise only if there exists, at some level, an intellectual universe defined by
shared assumptions and terms of description in which the merits or defects of
the arguments may be evaluated.
But it is a matter of some doubt whether such a universe exists, and, if it

* Professor of Law. University of Connecticut School of Law. I have been the beneficiary of useful
discussions with, and suggestions by, a number of my colleagues at the University of Connecticut School of
Law. Hugh MacGill has been particularly generous.
I. K. VONNEGUT, MOTHER NIGHT v (1979).
2. J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REvIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 1 (1980) [hereinafter cited
as CHOPERI.
3. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 41 (1980) [hereinafter cited as ELY]. "'Non-interpretivist" judicial review refers to a model of judicial behavior in which the Supreme Court determines the validity of
government actions, at least in part, by reference to criteria not derived or inferable from the text of the
Constitution. See id. at I.
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does, what its characteristics are. The implicit background against which
theoretical constitutional debate is conducted seems to me to have received
inadequate attention. The appearance of these two distinguished works of
constitutional commentary presents an appropriate opportunity to reconsider
the nature of constitutional argumentation.
I.
H. L. A. Hart has provided several concepts that illuminate both the
nature of a standard for constitutional law criticism and the relationship to
such a standard of the duty and authority of the Supreme Court. He has
argued that in every legal system there exists a "rule of recognition [which
provides] the criteria by which the validity of other rules of the system is
assessed ..... ,, Such a rule acquires its status by the "acceptance" of the
society whose legal system it governs. This acceptance involves the existence
of a "critical reflective attitude" toward the rule, which manifests itself in
regular criticism of departures from it. This attitude must be held by the
officials of the legal system. It is sufficient if private citizens generally obey
the rules that are valid under that rule of recognition which is so accepted.5
Such an attitude, and therefore the rule of recognition itself, is thus a consequence of the habits and understanding of the members of society. In the
United States, such a rule would provide the reference for deciding disputed
questions as to the legal validity of acts of the government, that is, for
determinations of constitutionality.
It would be easy to conclude that the rule of recognition coincides with
the written constitution. 6 Such an assumption fits naturally with what is
conceded to be the orthodox understanding of constitutional law, that
expounded in and exemplified by the founding case of Marbury v. Madison.7
On this view the written Constitution itself defines the legitimate functions of
government. When actions of the government are challenged, it is the duty of

4. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 102 (1961).
For example, a simple legal system may provide that

whatever the King enacts is law, or in a more complicated system, that what the King in Parliament enacts is
law. Such a rule is a "secondary rule'" which, in contrast to a "primary" rule which requires conduct, is a
"power-conferring'" rule leading *'to the creation or variation of duties or obligations." As such, it provides the

authorization for the promulgation of constitutional rules (both primary and secondary) which directly define
and limit the government. Id. at 27-32, 79, 91-93. 1 recognize of course that the utility of the concept of a rule of
recognition has been the subject of considerable academic discussion. See, e.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 46-68 (1977). For reasons which would be beyond the reasonable scope of this essay,
however, I continue to find Hart's analysis powerful and enlightening. The attempt to introduce into the
definition of the rule of recognition some prior impersonal limitation raises the complications which are the

subject of this essay.
5. Id. at 55-56, 110-14.

6. Hart himself, however, appears to recognize this distinction but assumes that the value of recognition
in the United States legal system specifies the "clauses of its constitution [as] a supreme criterion of validity.'
See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 103 (1%1). Of course it is possible for there to be a rule of recognition
which places almost exclusive emphasis on a constitutional text, see text accompanying notes 35-41 infra, but

that is not obviously the case in the United States, even granting the creative possibilities of constitutional
interpretation. See HART, supra, at 4.

7 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
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a court to measure the actions against the written rules and to announce
whether those rules have been violated. This model postulates a rule of
recognition that8 is both unchanging and impersonal, a "government of laws
and not men."But skeptics of this description of constitutionalism have a long tradition.
The constitutional language invoked is often far from clear, and the Supreme
Court, which is charged with applying the rule, is, as a matter of law, practically beyond correction. The result, the skeptics (who can conveniently, if
somewhat crudely, be termed legal realists,) 9 argue, is not the "rule of law"
but the "rule of the justices." In fact, the results (although not the rhetoric) of
constitutional adjudication over the course of our national history appear to
support this realist cynicism as to any substantial controlling force of the
text in important sectors of constitutional law.'I Moreover, the decisions
of the Supreme Court that, in determining the validity or invalidity of government actions, omit reference to or inference from the textual rules are still
broadly accepted as authoritative statements of law. That being the case, the
rule of recognition must necessarily contain elements other than a direction to
consult the written Constitution. The rule of recognition itself dictates the
nature and amount of influence the constitutional text should have in the
determination of the validity of acts of government. It is antecedent to the
actual constitutional rules applied, whether those rules are written or unwritten, and may properly be called a preconstitutional rule.
I use the term "preconstitutional rule" as the equivalent of Hart's rule of

8. MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30. This understanding ofjudicial review was fora long time so self-evident as
to require no name. See Machen, Tire Elasticity of the Constitution, 14 HARV. L. REV. 200, 203 (1900). Now it
has been given many: interpretivism, textualism, originalism, and intentionalism are some. See ELY, supra note
3, at I & n.*; Brest, Tire Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204,204 (1980).
9. The legal realists, who flourished in the middle of the twentieth century, may generally be associated
with a position disparaging the impact of abstract legal rules on legal decisionmaking. An extreme version of this
view is found in the early work of Jerome Frank. See J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 140-49 (1963)
(Isted. 1930). Of course, the realists were a diverse group and individuals among them expressed different
attitudes at different times. See W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVENIENT 70-83
(1973). But with respect to constitutional law, they were united by scom for the idea that the rules of the
constitutional text were the critical factor in constitutional adjudication. This understanding they associated at
best with self deception and, at worst, with deceit. Karl Llewellyn, in an unusual foray into constitutional law,
gibed that the orthodox theory's hold was maintained "-[o]nly because the Supreme Court has been so good at
three-card monte .....- Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. I, 17 (1934). See
generally F. RODELL, NINE MEN (1955); Lemer, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism, 42 YALE L. J.
668 (1933). An insightful discussion of the relationship of legal realism to modem constitutional jurisprudence is
Linde. Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972).
This tradition of constitutional law criticism is, of course, far older than the realists. Long ago, Bishop
Hoadley put the position succinctly in his often quoted claim that "[whoever hath an absolute authority to
interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is the lawgiver to all intents and purposes, and not the person
who first wrote or spake them.' Quoted in J. GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OFTHE LAW 102 (1972). See
also C. TIEDMANN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OFTHE UNITED STATES (1890); Powell, The Logic and
Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 15J. PHIL. 645 (1918).
10. Critics of all persuasions seem to agree that the Supreme Court has substantially departed from any
reasonable interpretation of the drafters' intentions, at least in important areas of constitutional law. E.g., R.
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 205 (1980); Grey, Do We Have An Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703
(1975).
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recognition in the specific context of American judicial review." The preconstitutional rule states the way the Supreme Court should determine the criteria of validity of government actions-the way it is to determine the constitutional rules. The distinction between preconstitutional rules and constitutional rules is important. A preconstitutional rule might be: "Use as the
criteria for validity of government action those rules found in the 1787 Constitution as amended except insofar as those rules would invalidate measures
which are necessary to prevent a national disaster." Given this preconstitutional rule one might come up with either a constitutional rule that makes
invalid all governmental acts impairing private contracts, or a rule that generally upholds significant classes of contract impairment legislation. The proviso at the end of the preconstitutional rule might make either an appropriate
constitutional rule, depending on the Court's judgment concerning the nature
and imminence of a national disaster. Critics may find fault with the constitutional rule in each case while tacitly accepting the preconstitutional rule.
It follows that there are at least two kinds of criticism of judicial review.
First, as in the case just put, there may be criticism of the Court's promulgation of particular constitutional rules under a preconstitutional rule that is
itself unchallenged. This would amount to an argument that the preconstitutional rule has been violated or misapplied. Second, on a different level, there
may be criticism of the preconstitutional rule itself as an imperfect technique
of limited government and argument that an altered rule, perhaps according a
greater (or lesser) influence to the constitutional text, is preferable. Each of
these kinds of criticism requires further explanation.
First, in considering the nature of criticism of the Court for departing
from the preconstitutional rule, one must contend with the legal finality of the
Supreme Court's interpretations of that rule. Criticism on this level may
proceed only if we separate two analytically distinct questions. The first is:
What is the proper method for determining criteria of validity in the legal
system-that is, what is the preconstitutional rule? The second is: Who
administers the preconstitutional rule, applying it, interpreting it, and conclusively announcing the criteria of validity derived from it?' 2 With regard to the
second question, I am taking as given the ordinarily unquestioned institutional
arrangements by which the Supreme Court's conclusions are final on issues of

I1.I thus take as given the institution ofjudicial review by the Supreme Court in discussing proposals for
preconstitutional rules, as well as in describing some existing rule. As an abstract matter, a rule of recognition
does not presuppose any particular institutional arrangements. See note 12 infra.

12. Hart recognizes that intimately connected to the rule of recognition are other secondary rules that
specify the conditions by which courts may "make authoritative determinations of the fact that a rule has been
broken." These "rules of adjudication," in a sense, also specify a rule of recognition. H. HART, THE CONCEPT
OF LAW 94-95 (1961). But he also makes clear that the rules of adjudication cannot subsume an independent rule
of recognition even when they vest final adjudicative authority in some court. See text accompanying note 14
infra. It would certainly be possible for there to be controversy on the question of who authoritatively deter-

mines validity as well as on what the criteria for validity ought to be, although in the United States this question
is largely in our constitutional past. For an interesting discussion of this distinction see Levinson, "The
Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123.
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constitutionality. Hart has shown, however, that this assumption does not
render the first question insignificant. The finality of judicial review does not
make it definitionally the case that the preconstitutional rule is: "The criteria
of validity are what the Supreme Court says they are. "' 3 Consider the rules of
a game that is first played without any officials. The established rules are not
automatically altered by the introduction of an official scorer, even if that
scorer's decisions are to be treated as conclusive. The game has not been
changed to one in which "the score is what the scorer says it is." Unofficial
statements about the score would still be something more than a prediction of
the scorer's announcement. Both official and unofficial statements of the
score are reasonably thought to be conclusions drawn from an application of
the same impersonal scoring rule. This will be true although these statements
may, on occasion, differ and although only the scorer's statement has any
operative effect.' 4 In the same way, we may have an abstract standard for
determining the validity of government actions that is logically independent of
the Supreme Court's decisions, notwithstanding the fact that only the Court's
constructions of that standard can have any juridical effect. Indeed, it is only
the existence of such a standard that makes sensible the constant stream of
conventional legal criticism of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisions.' 5
Second, criticism of the preconstitutional rule itself points up the distinction between the content of the rule as a subject for factual investigation and
as a subject for normative argument.' 6 Hart is primarily interested in showing
the fact of the existence of a rule of recognition as an indispensable element of
a legal system. At any moment there presumably exists a fairly well-defined
preconstitutional rule that, in fact, governs constitutional adjudication. Since
the rule is a function of the conscious acceptance of officials-here, most
crucially, the judges-and the aquiescence of the general population, a social
scientist may be able to discover the rule by empirical investigation of the
behavior and attitudes of such participants in the legal system. 7 But it is also
possible to consider a legal system's preconstitutional rule in critical, evalua'

13. Compare Chief Justice Hughes' famous comment that "the constitution is what the judges say it is."
Quoted in H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 250 (1%1).
14. See id. at 138-40. Hart acknowledges there may be some sort of a game in which the only rule is that the
score is what the scorer says it is. Such a game might be called "scorer's discretion" and "some amusement
might be found in playing it if the scorer's discretion were exercised with some regularity .... Id. at 139.
Similarly there might be a preconstitutional rule analogous to "scorer's discretion" in which valid law is what
the Supreme Court says it is. See text accompanying notes 44-45 infra.
15. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 142-44 (1%1). Of course, it is difficult to imagine a game in
which a scorer might be accorded the degree of creative discretion which a judge is to exercise under some
versions of a preconstitutional rule. See id. at 141, and text accompanying notes 37-38 infra.
16. See id.at 104-05.
17. See text accompanying note 5 supra. Whether there is such a single rule is a question of fact. I assume
this is the case but do not defend that assumption here. See note 68 infra. The alternative is that constitutional
adjudication proceeds by aggregating the results of applying each judge's version of a preconstitutional rule, that
is,
by the equivalent of a collective whim ofthe Justices. This is,
of course. possible. The balance of the argument
of this essay would not become thereby irrelevant. It would still be possible to argue that there ought to be such
a rule and what the characteristics of such a rule ought tobe. The prospects of such a rule ever being of any
practical importance, however, would be minimal.
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tive terms. Given the needs and tastes of this society, is the existing preconstitutional rule a good one? And if it is not, what ought the preconstitutional rule
be?
Although such critical discussion of the preconstitutional rule might be
justified solely on the grounds that it makes clearer the existing basis of the
legal system, it will ordinarily assume that it is possible for the preconstitutional rule to change. Such discussion will normally presume that one way or
another, a legal system's preconstitutional rule is a question of choice. One
cannot reasonably argue that the official attitudes, particularly those of the
judges, which are essential to the establishment of a preconstitutional rule,
are jointly and consciously selected at particular times. A written constitution
may be "chosen" in this fashion but the preconstitutional rule that dictates
how it is to be used most likely must arise in a gradual "Burkean" fashion,
reflecting a complex of social factors.'8 But the improbability of conscious
choice does not mean that the preconstitutional rule is not something that can
profitably be discussed, analyzed, and criticized. Such activity is futile only if
one adopts a rigidly determinist outlook of one sort or another. If one
believes, instead, that our ideas about the right or wrong of legal practices and
institutions may critically, albeit indirectly, influence the development of
those practices and institutions, it would seem an acceptable convention to
speak as ifthe preconstitutional rule were a matter of conscious choice.' 9
Normative appraisal of the merits or flaws of a preconstitutional rule and
its alternatives must be distinguished from discussions of the validity of the
preconstitutional rule. Hart points out that, since the rule of recognition is
defined as the ultimate reference for criteria of legal validity, it makes no
sense to talk of the rule itself as valid or invalid. Validity is a concept that has
meaning only from a viewpoint internal to the legal system. Since the preconstitutional rule essentially defines that system it can only be evaluated
from an external viewpoint. 0
18. The preconstitutional rule is therefore analogous to the lower-case usage of constitution that is com-

monly used to refer to fundamental governmental principles. It is this sense of constitution of which Joseph
deMaistre said (speaking particularly of the British constitution):
Certainly it has not been made a priori. Never have statesmen gathered together and said: Let us create
these powers, balance them in such and such a manner, and so on: No one has thought this. The

Constitution is the work of circumstances, and the number of circumstances is infinite.
J. DEMAISTRE, Essay on the Generative Principles of Political Constitutions, in THE WORKS OF JOSEPH
DEMAISTRE 147, 152 (J.Lively ed. 1965) (emphasis in original). See E. CORWIN, Constitutionv. Constitutional
Theory, in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 99 (1964).

19. The difference of opinion mentioned in the text suggests an intellectual argument that obviously cannot
be summarized here. With respect to the narrower question of the autonomy of legal doctrine see generally L.
POSPICIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIVE THEORY 127-92 (1971)(surveying theories of change
in legal systems). Cf. G. E. 'WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY (1980) (arguing

that academic writing has influenced the development of tort rules). A recent summary is Feinman, Book
Review, 78 MICH. L. REV. 722 (1980). My own position is stated briefly, although not defended, in Section III
below. See also note 71 infra, concerning the possibility of sufficient tacit agreement on values in society to

make possible any stable preconstitutional rule.
20. When a social group has certain rules of conduct, this fact offers an opportunity for many closely

related yet different kinds of assertion; for it is possible to be concerned with the rules, either merely as
an observer who does not himself accept them, or as a member of the group which accepts and uses
them as guides to conduct. We may call these respectively the "external" and the "'internal points of

view."
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When we move from saying that a particular enactment is valid, because it satisfies
the rule [that] what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law, to saying that in
England the last rule is used by courts, officials, and private persons as the ultimate rule of recognition, we have moved from an internal statement of law asserting the validity of a rule of the system to an external statement of fact which an
observer of the system might make even if he did not accept it. So too when we
move from the statement that a particular enactment is valid, to the statement that
the rule of recognition of the system is an excellent one and the system based on it
is one worthy of support, we have moved from a statement of legal validity to a

statement of value.

It should be clear, then, that when we argue about the way in which the
Supreme Court ought to use the constitutional text and other factors in its
adjudication, we are arguing about the "correctness" of a particular preconstitutional rule. For the reasons stated, such discussion is not about the
proper application of an accepted standard of legal validity, but about what
that standard should be. We are therefore necessarily outside the realm of
conventional legal discourse. Our use of the term "ought" in this context
must have reference to nonlegal criteria, to our basic political, moral, or
aesthetic convictions.2 Even though arguments for or against a preconstitutional rule are necessarily extralegal, it is crucial to recall that the office of such a rule is to specify
criteria of validity that are to be accepted as binding, that is, as law. We can
debate the wisdom of a preconstitutional rule only from the external viewpoint, but to be a preconstitutional rule it must be accepted from the internal
viewpoint.- To fail to understand the internal dimension of the preconstitutional rules is to miss a critical aspect of the legal system. Still, when we are
speaking in terms of an existing or a proposed preconstitutional rule, we are
speaking of nothing more or less than an artificial intellectual construct that
public officials, here the Justices of the United States Supreme Court, use to
determine the criteria for separating the valid from the invalid among challenged actions of government. We are speaking of an idea about the proper
reach and organization of the power of the state.

H. HART. THE CONCEPT OF LAW 86 (1961). See id. at 103-07; Mandel, Dworkin, Hart and the Problem of
TheoreticalPerspective, 14 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 57, 59-66 (1979); Wade, The Basis of Legal Sovereignty, 1955
CAMBRIDGE. L.J. 172, 187-97.
21. H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 104-05 (1961).
22. Thus it is anomalous to argue, for example, that recourse to the intention of the Framers of the

Constitution is required because such adjudication is itself constitutionally required and the requirement is
demonstrated from a review of the Framers' intention. Cf. Jones, The Brooding Omnipresence ofConstitutional
Law, 4 VT. L. REV. 1. 27 (1979); Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Religion, 1979 SUP. Cr. REV.
123, 137. The analysis in the text reveals that one may quite reasonably argue for adhering to the Framers'
understanding of the Constitution even in the face of evidence that they intended otherwise.
23. Such acceptance as binding, of course, does not mean that even the persons who so view it must
believe it to be morally or politically a good rule. However, a persistent divergence between the character of the
accepted preconstitutional rule and the moral principles of those who accept will, no doubt, eventually undermine its acceptance. See T. MORAWETZ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 26-27 (1980).
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II.
Given this analytic framework, it is possible to recast, somewhat more
clearly, the essential questions argued by modem constitutional scholarship.
Such argument necessarily proceeds on two levels corresponding to the
internal and external viewpoints. Much conventional constitutional law
writing criticizes and analyzes the work of the Supreme Court in terms of its
consistency with the purpose of the constitutional provisions invoked, prior
case law, sound public policy, and the correct institutional role of the Court. 24
But to a great degree, this writing takes for granted the propriety of these
factors and the weight they ought to have in the underlying preconstitutional
rule. It does not overtly consider the desirability of that assumed rule. A
growing body of literature, however, examines, at least in part, and in a rather
explicit way, these fundamental questions of the political organization and
authority of both the government as a whole and of the Supreme Court.2'
The new contributions by Professors Ely and Choper certainly fall into
this category. Ely proposes that the Court, in addition to enforcing clear
textual restrictions, ensure that the government remain democratically
responsive by policing strictly the regulation of the franchise, by prohibiting
certain kinds of interference with free expression, and by correcting the misallocation of public benefits and burdens that can result from the structural
and systematic underrepresentation of certain groups.26 The insistence on this
kind of activity is premised, at least in significant part, on arguments not
rooted in any understanding of the constitutional text.27 But assigning to the
Court the task of protecting any other non-text-based values is disparaged. 2
Ely's choices in this regard are not based on any presumptively authoritative
legal criteria, 29 but on an explicit political preference for democratic decisionmaking.30 Similarly, Choper calls on the Court to decline to decide cases
involving the limits of federal power relative to that of the states or cases
involving the limits on the power of the branches of the federal government
with respect to each other. He defends this view on the grounds that the
constitutional values of separation of powers and federalism are already
24. The paradigm for this kind of constitutional law writing is probably the annual review ofcases decided

by the Supreme Court in the previous term published in each November issue of the Harvard Law Review.
25. E.g., R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 131-49 (1977); Brest, The Misconceived Quest for
the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REV. 204 (1980); Linde, Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82
YALE L.J. 227 (1972); Monaghan, Tile Constitution Goes to Harvard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 117 (1978);
Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American GoLernment, 66
GEO. L.J. 1191 (1978); Tribe. Structural Due Process, 10 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 269 (1975).
26. See ELY, supra note 3, at 73-179.

27. See id. at 101-04.
28. See id. at 43-72.
29. There is some ambiguity in Professor Ely's book concerning the nature of his argument. While he
proposes an alternative to both interpretivist and noninterpretivist models, he premises his argument, in substantial part, upon a reading of the Constitution. That this reference is deemed necessary may indicate a

justification by recourse to an already accepted preconstitutional rule that emphasizes the critical nature of the
constitutional text in determining validity. In reviewing Ely's book. I have discussed this matter at somewhat
greater length. See Kay, Book Review, 13 CONN. L. REV. __

30. See ELY, supra note 3, at 4-8, 101-04.

(1980).
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largely protected by the institutional structures of the government and that
such abdication will protect the Court's capacity to deal with issues of individual rights. 3' But here too this preference for the protection of certain values
over others does not respond to a strictly legal question. 2 In each case, these
authors are engaged in a critical analysis of the preconstitutional rule-suggesting changes in it and refinements to it. Argument on this level cannot
proceed by reference to any settled legal standards since that standard is the
subject of the discussion. The justifications for these kinds of proposals must
be external to the legal system and in terms of general morality, political
theory, and aesthetic preference:"
We can see more clearly how such argument proceeds and the kinds of
considerations that are relevant in appraising it by considering two opposing
characteristics that a preconstitutional rule may possess. To the extent that a
preconstitutional rule is "closed," it will specify strictly, and in advance, the
criteria for legal validity. On the other hand, a rule will be "open" to the
extent that it leaves unresolved possible future issues of validity. 34 To illustrate this opposition we can examine two extreme, if familiar, candidates for
acceptance as the preconstitutional rule, one illustrating a radically closed
version, the other an equally open one. I do not suppose there is anyone who
seriously and exclusively advocates either model, but their drastic simplicity
helps demonstrate the kinds of factors that count in choosing a preconstitutional rule.
The very closed rule is a limited version of the formula of Marbury v.
Madison:35 "Properly promulgated government acts are valid only insofar as
31. See CHOPER. supra note 2. at 175-378.
32. Professor Choper describes his effort in modest language, claiming to deal only with the jurisdictional
as opposed to substantive role of the Court. See CHOPER, supra note 2, at I. It is true that within the area
Choper denotes as 'Individual Rights- he does not discuss the criteria for validity of government action. But in
major parts of what has been traditionally deemed the realm of constitutional law-the power of the federal
government relative to the states and of the branches of the federal government relative to each other-by
calling on the Court to refrain from decision he implicitly sets out a criterion for at least enforceable legal
validity. So far as the Court is concerned, all exercises of such governmental power are to be treated as if they
were valid. His arguments for this position are arguments for a preconstitutional rule. They are extralegal. See,
e.g., id. at 220-21. 285.
33. Argument concerning the content of the preconstitutional rule may take place within the context of
constitutional adjudication. Hart states that, like every rule, the rule of recognition must have an area of open
texture in which the application of the rule is not self-evident and some judicial creativity is called for. See H.
HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 146-50 (1%1). The extent to which courts should feel constrained in exercising
this power is a separate question. See Morawetz, The Rules of Law and the Point of Law, 121 U. PA. L. REV.
859 (1973). The discussion in this essay may be understood as one about the amount of open texture which is
appropriate in a preconstitutional rule.
34. Although different in significant ways and employed for a different purpose, this distinction owes much
to that between open and closed practices used by my colleague. Thomas Morawetz in Morawetz, The Rules of
Law and the Point ofLaw, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 859 (1973). Professor Levinson makes a similar division between
those seeing the source of doctrine as inhering exclusively in the text and those who regard as authoritative both
the text and an unwritten tradition. Analogizing these positions to Christian differences on the role of scripture
he labels the former view "Protestant- and the latter "Catholic." See Levinson, "'The Constitution-' in
Ainerican Civil
Religion, 1979 SUP. CT. REV. 123, 132-36.
35. 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). Marbury itself cannot reasonably be understood as standing for the very
closed rule hypothesized since, although the decision is closely tied to the constitutional text, it clearly recognized that constitutional rules may be implied by the textual provisions as well as explicitly stated there. That
was certainly the case with the limitation on the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court applied in that case.
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they are authorized by a particular and explicit grant of power contained in
the text of Constitution and if they do not contravene any explicit prohibition
found within the text.36 The language of the written constitution's provisions,
moreover, is to be understood in exactly the sense intended by those who
wrote, proposed,
and ratified it without reference to any changed circum37
stances."
This rule, of course, is a narrow application of what continues to be the
orthodox constitutional theory, generally espoused by the Court itself. It is
most familiar when stated from the internal viewpoint. It is here considered
from the external viewpoint as a possibly good or bad basis upon which to
establish a legal system. There is, a priori,no reason why such a closed rule
based on the text could not be chosen, not because the document exerts any
mystical binding power, but because we think proceeding as if its provisions
were binding will, as a moral, political, or aesthetic matter, make for good
government.3 9
But can it plausibly be argued on any of those grounds that a preconstitutional rule should be adopted that tests the validity of government actions
according to unyielding criteria which were drafted for a different people, at a
different time, addressed to different needs and problems? In fact, the preconstitutional rule described has substantial appeal, precisely because of its
closed nature. An extremely closed rule meshes most comfortably with what
is ordinarily conceded to be the animating purpose of the establishment of
constitutional government-to limit the reach of public power.40 Reference to
an explicit and static set of written rules most sharply defines the extent of
governmental authority. 4 1 This is not to say that even this very closed rule

36. Closed constitutional rules may provide criteria of decision unrelated to any text. "The criteria of
validity are those found in the 1787 text as amended except foracts of the legislature imposing taxes all of which
will be found valid" would be a rule as closed as that described in the text. See note 45 infra and the discussion
of the closed rule inferable from Choper's proposals.
37. The federal nature of American goverment necessarily adds some complications. The characterization
in the text, applied to federal constitutional law, would be true only ofthe federal government. State government,
as a matter of federal constitutional law, would, to the same extent, be unlimited except insofar as specific textual
prohibitions were identified. Of course, the state government may be limited in the more comprehensive way by
a state constitution.
38. See text accompanying notes 66-67 infra for a discussion of Justice Roberts' statement about the role of
the Court. It is probably the case that most judges see the preconstitutional rule as almost exclusively directing
reference to the constitutional text, but such judges differ on the nature of their duty of interpretation. Only
rarely have nonacademics gone to the extreme of explicitly proposing a preconstitutional rule with a significant
nontextual component.
39. See Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 833. 844-45,
864-65 (193 1); Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in American
Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191 (1978). See also Berger, The Scope of JudicialReviei':A Continuing Dialogue,
31 S. C. L. REV. 171 (1980) (arguing that the Court ought not to be entrusted with decisions at this level).
40. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 176-92 (1960). But see Jones, The Brooding
Omnipresence oJ ConstitutionalLaw, 4 VT. L. REV. 1,2 (1979) (emphasizing the role of the Constitution in
facilitating government activity).
41. This is not, however, to say that a government so limited will necessarily be a "weak" government. See
text accompanying notes 47-48 infra.
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would eliminate all uncertainty as to the propriety of government actions. But
compared to most other alternatives, adherence to a written text, understood
to have a meaning fixed at particular moments, is probably about the best
human intelligence can provide.
But the problem with this approach is exactly that it works too well. To
the extent that we do not fear the power of government, but fear instead its
inability to fulfill our demands in solving new problems, an unchanging, rigid
set of limits may get in the way.42 The need to change the contours of governmental authority over time argues for a preconstitutional rule that incorporates flexibility and adaptability in defining and redefining the permissible
scope of state power.
Flexibility is the outstanding characteristic of the alternative extreme
candidate, a very open preconstitutional rule, cast in the following form:
"Properly promulgated governmental actions are valid if the Supreme Court
43
does not disapprove them." No criteria are specified for the Court to follow.
While the first rule reserves a predominant role for the constitutional text and
reduces the job of the Justices of the Supreme Court to little more than that of
administrators, the second rule eliminates any role for the text and elevates
the importance of the unrestricted political judgment of the Justices of the
Supreme Court. This rule would, again as a matter of preference, identify the
preconstitutional rule with the final authority of the Supreme Court to construe and apply it. It would adopt as the basis of the legal system the proposi44
tion that "[t]he law (or the constitution) is what the courts say it is."
As a normative position this preconstitutional rule also has a substantial
attraction. This approach to determining legal validity of government action is
most capable of yielding a set of government powers most responsive to the
problems of changing times. Government could not, in any permanent sense,
be barred from exercising any power that might, in some circumstances,
promote the public welfare. Nor could it, in advance, be assured the legal
capacity to act or to restrict private action when to do so might constitute a
serious evil.
The difficulty here is just the opposite of that associated with the very
closed rule. This rule might be termed "anticonstitutionalist" since it fails to
place any knowable prior limits on government activity. Neither officials nor
private persons could have fixed expectations of the boundaries of permissible public actions. There would be no legal definition of government as a
42. This is a general characteristic of government by prior rules. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAV
124-27 (1961);
Schochet, Introduction:Constitutionalism,Liberalism, and the Study of Politics, in XX NOMOS

I. 8 (1979). But the form of the rules may dictate how important this problem will be in practice.
43. From the special viewpoint of the Justices of the Supreme Court, this extreme version might not
properly be called a "'rule' at all since it imposes no restrictions on their discretion.
44. H. HART. THE CONCEPT OF LAW 138 (1961).
This aphorism is attributed to Chief Justice Charles
Evans Hughes. Id. at 250. A position very close to this, at least with respect to the broad clauses of the
Constitution, is found in Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of ConstitutionalLaw, 15 J.PHIL. 645 (1918). A legal

system with this preconstitutional rule would be analogous to what Hart calls a game of "scorer's discretion."
See note 14 supra.
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whole and consequently no meaningful internal criticism of the exercise of the
Court's power.45
The choice between a more open or a more closed preconstitutional rule
has important implications for the nature of the government defined under it.
It is directly related to the extent to which government power is legally
limited. As used here, however, the extent of legal limitation does not necessarily correlate with the legal breadth and potency of governmental power.
The difference between open and closed rules goes to the clarity and certainty
of constitutional limits. Sharply defined constitutional rules are logically compatible with a strong and far-reaching governmental power. Such clarity
serves the purpose of those who generally fear government, but it does so in a
particular way by giving the crucial assurance that there is a knowable and6
stable sphere of conduct immune from government regulation or prohibition.4
Maitland put the point this way:
The exercise of power in ways which cannot be anticipated causes some of the
greatest restraints, for restraint is most felt and therefore is greatest when it is least
anticipated. We feel ourselves least free when we know that restraints may at any
moment be placed on any of our actions, and yet we cannot anticipate these
restraints .... Known general laws, however bad, interfere less with freedom
than decisions based on no previously known rule.47

This is not the only way to restrain government, and it may not be a sufficient
way. Obviously the substantive content of the preconstitutional rule will be of
critical importance in effectuating desired limitations. But some stability and
predictability seem to be necessary preconditions for the effectuation of any
kind of limitation.48
45. Of course, a legal system with such a preconstitutional rule would still be weaker than one in which
there were no judicial review, because the authority of government would be divided and therefore harder to
exercise. But this would not provide the special benefits of clear definition of government which can only be
supplied by prior impersonal rules. See text accompanying notes 46-48 infra. The Court. under this rule, would
perform a function similar to that envisioned for the Council of Revision which was rejected at the 1787
Convention. See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 649-50 (1943)(Frankfurter J.. dissenting).
The extremes of open and closed preconstitutional rules have been presented with respect to the role they
give to the written Constitution in determining validity. But the same characteristics differentiate proposed
preconstitutional rules that are either predominantly textual or nontextual. Thus, there may be agreement on
complete reference of questions of validity to the text but disagreement on methods of interpretation. Compare
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 370-71 (1977) (constitutional language is to be read in the sense
understood by the Framers), with R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 132-37 (1977)(Constitution
should be construed with reference to concepts prescribed but not by any particular conceptions of those
concepts held by the Framers). Similarly, in writing a constitution, a preference for a closed rule will reveal itself
in a use of specific and detailed provisions instead of vague language. Nontextual preconstitutional rules may
also be more or less open, depending on how many and how narrow are the nontextual values to which the
Court is referred. In this sense, Professor Ely's specification of "representative democracy" seems to provide a
more closed rule than Professor Wellington's reference to "conventional morality." See Wellington, Common
Lai' Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 265-311
(1973). See text accompanying notes 50-52 infra.
46. "The knowne certaintie of the law is the safetie of all," E. COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND, (FIRST PART) 395 (1633). quoted in Leedes, The Supreme Court Mess, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1361, 1416
(1979). See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 156-59, 208-09 (1960). But see Ritter, The Anarchist
Justification of Authority, in XIX NOMOS 130 (1978).
47. Quoted in F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 449 (1960).
48. Of course, it is conceivable that we could have a preconstitutional rule that is quite closed but which
declares all acts of government agencies as valid. (The rule of parliamentary supremacy may be such a rule.)
And, on the other hand, an open rule at least presents some probability of actually limiting the government. At
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This distinction between limited government and weak government
explains what might otherwise appear an anomaly in the depiction of the two
extreme prototypes of preconstitutional rules. For it portrays the proponent
of strictly limited governmental power (the civil libertarian, perhaps) as favoring a closed preconstitutional rule, one which will shackle substantially the
power of the Supreme Court. Yet, it is the Court to which opponents of
governmental power have traditionally looked to check abuses of government. But the question of strict or flexible legal limitations must be applied to
the government as a whole, and the Court is itself an agency of government. A
relatively unrestrained Supreme Court may clash with the other branches,
thus reducing the sum of government power. But the very lack of restraint
makes this a matter of substantial speculation. The breadth of governmental
power under an open preconstitutional rule rests largely within the discretion
of the judges. It is exactly a refusal to trust the undefinable responses of
public officials that animates the proponents of closed preconstitutional rules.
So, in this respect" a government defined by an extremely open preconstitutional rule involves no necessary advance from one in which the direct power
of government has no constitutional limitations at all. Rather, the ultimate
decision on government action is merely transferred from one group to
another. While we might trust the Court more than the other agencies of
government, this is still an assurance of an entirely different kind from that
implicit in faithful application of a closed preconstitutional rule. Reliable
restraint is found only in subordinating personal judgments to predefined
impersonal rules.
Between the two extreme preconstitutional rules described fall the innumerable suggestions of constitutional scholarship. These proposals are
never as simple as the models put forward. They usually involve some compound of adherence to the intended meaning of the constitutional text and
discretion to adjudicate in light of new situations. That part of the Court's
authority which is without textual basis is, moreover, ordinarily further limited
by some verbal formulae directing the Court to some broad values, or stipulating some method it should employ in exercising its judgment. Such non-textbased directives limit the Court's discretion, sometimes very generally, and
sometimes rather strictly. Such a compound rule might call for adherence to
the written text, except when relations with other nations are involved, in
which case any joint action of the executive and legislature is valid. Or it
might demand that valid acts both conform to the text and that they do not
inhibit the growth of capital. But each proposed preconstitutional rule represents, in part, some compromise between the merits and flaws of the very
open and very closed rules postulated.49 In evaluating these proposals, we will

be influenced by the extent to which those extreme rules attract or repel us. It

this extreme there may be no increase in certainty supplied by the closed rule unless the legislature was
somehow more predictable than the Court.
49. See note 64 infra.
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may be useful, therefore, to examine at somewhat greater length the values
and attitudes associated with those hypothetical positions.
It is necessary first to consider the one aspect of these arguments that has
received the most attehtion in the academic commentary. This is the opposition between democratic and judicial decisionmaking. A closed preconstitutional rule is generally deemed more congenial to democracy because it is
thought to leave intact the decisions of the politically accountable branches in
instances when those decisions would be more vulnerable to invalidation
under an open rule.50 But it is not at all clear that this association is justified.
First, there is some question whether the concept of democracy is so univocal
as to support the assumption that the decisions of everyday legislation and
executive action are better expressions of the popular will than the decisions
of the drafters and ratifiers of the Constitution whose judgment governs in the
most familiar closed rules--especially when combined with the fact that those
decisions have not been altered by amendment .5 Second, and more importantly, there is nothing inherent in a fairly open preconstitutional rule that
requires greater interference with the decisions of the political branches than
would occur under a more closed rule. All depends upon the substantive
character of the open rule under discussion. For example, the "political question" doctrine is manifestly a nontextual device of constitutional adjudication,
and, as it has evolved, provides very little in the way of advance guidance. 2
Such a doctrine could only be proper under a considerably open rule. But that
doctrine serves to leave intact determinations by the other branches that
might well be struck down under a closed rule founded on strict adherence to
the constitutional text. The same conclusion is illustrated by the books of
Professors Ely and Choper. Each proposes, in effect, a preconstitutional rule
that is based, in each case, at least partially, on nontextual values.13 But they
are proposed, in large measure, for the express purpose of immunizing democratic decisionmaking from reversal by undemocratic judicial review.- 4 Of
50. This has become, more or less, an axiom of constitutional law scholarship (notwithstanding some
attempts to show the contrary), with attention focused almost exclusively on those instances of non-text-based
review which serve as a basis for striking down legislative acts. See, e.g., CHOPER, supra note 2, at 4-12; ELY,
supra note 3, at 4-5.

51. Given the availability of amendment, constitutional rule may represent a democratic judgment that
certain governmental decisions be made slowly and with an even wider basis of assent. See F. HAYEK, THE

CONSTITUTION OF IBERTY 178-82 (1960). It is not obvious that democratic government is identical with the
cession of government power to exactly 50% plus one of the population, or that popular decisions be accomplished within any particular period of time. Professor Choper's extensive discussion of the relative responsiveness of the Supreme Court and other branches gives almost no attention to the relative claims of the legislature
and the constitutional text to a democratic character. See CHOPER, supra note 2, at 29-59. In a regime under the
hypothetical closed preconstitutional rule that comparison would be the critical issue.
52. See Scharpf, Judicial Review and the PoliticalQuestion: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517,

548-49 (1966). In some incarnations the political question doctrine involves a demand that the Court leave
certain decisions to those agencies of the government vested by a "textual commitment" with the power to
make them. See id. at 538. If there were nothing more, the doctrine would be consistent with a closed text-based
rule. Of course that is not the case. See Bickel, The Supreme Court, 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passire Virtues,

75 HARV. L. REv. 40, 45-46 (1961).
53. See text accompanying notes 27-28 supra.
54. See CHOPER, supra note 2, at 55-59, 169-70. (Choper's position is perhaps better stated as preserving
democratic decisionmaking in certain areas in order to prevent the hostility that would ensue from overruling
such decisions from restricting judicial authority in the field of individual rights.) ELY, supra note 3, at 101-04.
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course, certain versions of open preconstitutional rules would lead to more
interference with democratic political control than a closed, text-based rule.
But there is nothing automatic about such a result. In other words, there is no
easy correlation between a general preference for open or closed preconstitutional rules and an attachment to democratic government.
More plainly involved in the choice between open and closed preconstitutional rules is one's preference, already adverted to, for either stability and
certainty on the one hand, or for flexibility and adaptability on the other, in
defining the powers of government. This preference, however, is usually just
one manifestation of a more basic attitude toward the role of government in
human affairs. In particular, it is a function of the breadth and number of the
tasks that are assigned to government. If the state is understood to have the
sole purpose of providing the effective preconditions for individual (or voluntary joint) actions, then the ability to rely on a more fixed definition of the
government's power to upset the plans for such actions is critical.55 In contrast, if government is the agent for accomplishing certain corporate objectives, the ability to achieve those objectives in light of changing circumstances
will be frustrated by unyielding rules concerning the reach of public authority. 56 Moreover, the more broad and various are those social goals committed
to government, the more difficult it will be to be content with a closed rule
that defines in advance the capacities and limitations of government power.
This will be so not only because we will want the government to be effective,
but because, given the scope of its concerns, we may wish to allow the
formulation of new limits on it to prevent the unforeseeable injuries it might
inflict. At the extreme, to the extent we understand government as charged
with the responsibility to do whatever the public welfare requires, we will
demand an ongoing, changing process of definition, one more naturally
accommodated by an open preconstitutional rule.
55. See F. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 139-47 (1960).
56. Michael Oakeshott has presented two analogies from Roman law which are useful in understanding the
competing tendencies in the modem Western idea of the state. The idea, societas, unites its members not
in an enterprise to pursue a common substantive purpose or to promote a common interest, but [in an
association] of loyalty to one another, the conditions of which may achieve the formality denoted by
the kindred word -'legality".... It [is] a formal relationship in terms of rules, not a substantive
relationship in terms of common action.
M. OAKESHOTT. ON HUMAN CONDUCT 201 (1975). A state understood in these terms is "'anomocracy whose

laws are understood as conditions of conduct, not devices instrumental to the satisfaction of preferred wants."
Id. at 203. In contrast the association labeled universitas is one
in respect of some identified common purpose, in pursuit of some acknowledged substantive end, or in
the promotion of some specified enduring interest .... [A state organized on this principle may create]
managerial offices whose occupants are authorized to make the decisions in which theirjoint purpose is
pursued.... Government here may be said to be teleocratic, the management of a purposive concern.
Id. at 203. 205-06. The conception of the state necessarily is critical in the understanding of the role of law. It

may be "'a system of prescriptive conditions, indifferent (and not merely impartial) to the satisfaction of wants,
to be subscribed to in making choices about what to do or say," or it may be "a set of prudential managerial
conclusions specifying a common purpose and the manner in which this purpose shall be contingently pursued."

Id. at 23 1. Except in the case of the most simple and modest common pursuits, the latter understanding of law is
more consistent with a test of validity represented by an open preconstitutional rule. This becomes more
probable as the substantive objectives of the state expand in scope and complexity. See also Leedes, The
Supreme Court Mess, 57 TrEX. L. REV. 1371 (1979); Schochet, Introduction:Constitutionalism,Liberalism, and
tie Study of Politics, in XX NOMOS 4-5. 7-8 (1979).
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The choice between concepts of government will largely turn on evaluation
of the capacity of any public authority to accomplish the kinds of objectives
that might be set for it. It will also turn critically on one's estimate of the
likelihood that government may produce more evil than good in the pursuit of
those ends. The choice involves a trade-off between our expectation of benefit and our willingness to risk injury. One who is highly skeptical of the ability
of the state to accomplish useful goals and is, at the same time, highly fearful
of the abuses to which such power is prone will seek to mark off the assigned
tasks and available means strictly, and in advance, by a closed preconstitutional rule.57 An optimist as to government's tendency to beneficence will
wish to accord it the greater flexibility of an open rule."' The inclination
toward one side or the other of this range of outlooks will depend not only on
one's understanding of the facts of the history of government, but also on
one's personal affinity for risk-taking or caution.
But for most people, government restraint and government activity are
both to be desired in proper measure. 9 Consequently, a preconstitutional rule
will emerge that will compromise those interests in one of the several ways
that have been mentioned. The proposals of Professors Ely and Choper are
examples of the different ways in which that compromise might be struck.
Choper suggests that the Court refuse to invalidate exercises of the power of
the federal government even if they can be shown to invade an area reserved
to the state governments by the Constitution. 60 Although it ignores textual
proscriptions, the proposal provides criteria of validity which, in this area at
least, are quite definite: all such federal action is to be treated as valid. 6' This is
best characterized as a closed preconstitutional rule. Professor Ely, on the
57. See Schochet, Introduction:Constitntionalism,Liberalism, and the Study of Politics, in XX NOMOS 8

(1979) (-[T]he capacity for doing public good and engaging in civic education [is] equally the capacity for
doing
public evil. ").This was arguably the dominant viewpoint of the 18th century founders of the American republic,
as illustrated in both the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of 1787. See G. VOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC

604-06, 608-09 (1969).

Cf. M. OAKESHO'r,

ON HUMAN

CONDUCT 244 (1975). But see Jones, The Brooding Omnipresenceof ConstitutionalLaw. 4 VT.L. REV. 1, 1-2

(1979). That the risk of unrestrained government was widely understood to include the power of the judiciary is
also likely. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 300-I 1(1977).

58. For a modem expression of this view, at least as an abstract matter, see Horowitz, Book Review. 86
YALE L.J. 561, 566 (1977) ("Unless we are prepared to succumb to Hobbesian pessimism 'in this dangerous
century,' I do not see how a Man of the Left can describe the rule of law as 'an unqualified human good'! It
undoubtedly restrains power, but it also prevents power's benevolent exercise."). For an ancient one. see
PLATO, THE STATESMAN paras. 293-94 (B. Jowett transl.).
The optimistic view of governmental authority, when applied to the government as a whole, includes a faith
in the Supreme Court's capacity to formulate appropriate limits to the reach of the activities of government at

particular times and in particular circumstances. One having such an outlook will rely principally on the
institutional arrangements which have been assumed to yield the optimal definition of governmental power and
not, to any substantial degree, on any prior and rigid judgments. This kind of process is most easily accommodated by an open preconstitutional rule.
59. See Cooley, Comparative Merits of Written and PrescriptiveConstitutions,2 HARV. L. REV. 341, 349
(1889).

60. CHOPER, supra note 2, at 171-259.
61. This discussion is restricted to the relative powers of state and federal governments. In other respects

Choper may prefer a more open rule. This may be the case, for example, with respect to adjudication on
questions of individual rights. See id. at 70-79. The nature of that aspect of the rules, however, is a matter that
Choper scrupulously refrains from discussing. See, e.g., id. at 122.
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other hand, opts for a preconstitutional rule that is considerably more open. He
calls for the Court to invalidate any governmental trespass on the explicitly
drafted textual provisions of the Constitution,62 but he would add to those restrictions certain other criteria for validity, less obviously derived from the
text, which would direct the Court, in general, to preserve the proper functioning of representative democracy. 63 By including as a test of validity a broad value
such as representative democracy, which is both nontextual and capable of
drastically differing applications, Ely leaves a large aspect of governmental
power-the power to define its own decisionmaking process-without know64
able prior limitations. In this respect, Ely's proposal is for an open rule.
It must be re-emphasized that the preconstitutional rule which is, in fact,
applied is not, when viewed from the external, critical position of the academic, a question of law, nor could it be. At bottom it rests on a social choice,
and is desirable or undesirable only as a matter of judgment or taste concerning the proper relative roles of public and private activity. Moreover, if there
is no universally accepted moral or political position on this question, there
can be no intrinsically right definition of government. If there is no intrinsically right definition of government there can be no right or wrong preconstitutional rule. In that case, any preconstitutional rule, viewed externally, will
be arbitrary. 65 This will be equally true of every possible preconstitutional rule
along the spectrum from the extremely closed rule to the extremely open one.
III.
Once it is recognized that no preconstitutional rule, existing or suggested,
considered from the external point of view can have any claim to correctness
as a matter of law, many standard attitudes toward constitutional adjudication
appear in a new light. We might conclude that the absence of any authoritative

62. ELY, supra note 3, at 76-77.
63. Id. at 87-88.
64. In this particular respect, Ely's proposal shares a common feature with a school of constitutional
scholarship that combines textual proscriptions with limits based on resort to other more or less well-defined
values, discoverable by resort to the history, traditions, or morality of society. See text accompanying note 49
supra. Two good examples of such proposals are in Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases:A Comment on the
Supreme Court'sRole in American Government, 66 GEO. L.J. 1191 (1978), and Wellington, Common Law Rules
and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 265-311 (1973). Such

models are to be distinguished from even more open ones incorporating some area of unbounded discretion on
the part of the judges similar to that featured in the hypothetical open preconstitutional rule. In contrast these
models do not permit decision by reference to personal values. Moreover, their indeterminacy is only in the
direction of reducing rather than expanding government power. However, the imprecise nature of the nontextual criteria result in a preconstitutional rule in which the definition of government is to be, in large measure,
developed and altered in response to changing times rather than defined at a particular moment in time. It will
therefore appeal more to those who prize governmental adaptability and less to those who fear it.
The characterizations of the preconstitutional rules implicit in Ely's and Choper's work illustrate the fact

that there is no necessary correlation between the strength and breadth of government power and the open or
closed character of the preconstitutional rule. See text accompanying notes 46-48 supra. Choper's proposal as
to questions of federalism calls fora largely unchecked federal legislature and executive but is properly called a

closed rule. Ely's proposals for reinforcing democratic representation promises to substantially restrain the
political branches but remains an open rule.
65. See Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1246-48.
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standard for resolving our differences about the best preconstitutional rule
makes the extensive theoretical academic debate an exercise in futility. I do
not believe this to be the case. In fact, there is likely to be a fairly extensive
commonality of attitudes toward government among the participants in the
discussion. Fruitful argument may proceed on the question of which preconstitutional rule furthers the shared ideal of state power. But certainly in some
cases our inability to agree on questions of constitutional law will be a result
of our dispute on the proper characteristics of a preconstitutional rule. Those
differences will in turn be traceable to fundamentally incompatible views
concerning the proper role of government. Once this becomes clear, it makes
no sense to continue the argument.
For example, constitutional law teachers can always evoke a laugh by
quoting the statement of Justice Roberts in his opinion for the Court in United
States v. Butler: "When an act of Congress is appropriately challenged in the
courts as not conforming to the constitutional mandate the judicial branch of
the Government has only one duty-to lay the article of the Constitution
which is invoked beside the statute which is challenged and to decide if the
latter squares with the former." 66 If his meaning were as simple-in both
senses of the word-as it is often assumed to have been, Justice Roberts
would not have gone on, in the same paragraph, to describe the Court's office
in performing that duty as a "delicate and difficult" one. 67 It is plain from that
recognition, and from the actual decision in Butler, that he was speaking a
metaphor; he was recognizing the binding force of a substantially closed
preconstitutional rule. From the external viewpoint, the wisdom and practicality of such a rule may be challenged, but criticism will have to proceed
based on more general beliefs concerning the proper role of government, such
as those that have been canvassed. Some such beliefs, however, may not be
subject to rational argument. But there is nothing inherently more ridiculous
about the rule implicit in Justice Roberts' metaphor than that inferable from
the more "sophisticated" essays of Justices Frankfurter or Harlan, or a
myriad of academic commentators. In each case the preconstitutional rule is
not, in any legal sense, correct or incorrect. Each incorporates a personal
judgment about the jobs of government and law.
Justice Roberts' statement reminds us of another critical, and possibly
disturbing, aspect of this understanding of preconstitutional rules. It is clear
that the Justice was not really arguing for the closed rule. Rather, he was
summarizing the directives of a preconstitutional rule that he already took as
of binding force. That is to say, he was expressing the internal point of view
from which that rule, being axiomatic, was in no need of defense. But it has
been shown that this axiom, when examined from the external point of view,
will be controversial, even arbitrary. This juxtaposition of the unquestioned

66. 297 U.S. 1,62 (1936).
67. Id.at 63.

1981]

PRECONSTITUTIONAL RULES

authority of the preconstitutional rule as seen from the internal viewpoint and
the fact of its footless nature from the external viewpoint raises two questions. First, can such an artificial proposition in fact control the behavior of
judges? Secondly, if the preconstitutional rule does exert such an influence,
ought it to do so? Do we want a legal system premised on the uncritical, even
blind acceptance of a value-laden and subjective standard?
The first question raises the general issue of the potency of intellectual
models in affecting conduct. But if the nature of government and law is in any
way within our control, we can only effect our goals through the medium of
ideas. 68 Having chosen the kind of limitations we wish to impose on the
government, and having chosen independent judges as the ultimate guardians
of those limitations, we will need a means of inducing judges to subordinate
their critical faculties to the moral and political judgments implicit in the
preconstitutional rule. This requires a specification of their mental states. The
realist criticism of orthodox legal theory stemmed from a conviction that such
control was unlikely to be accomplished by the formulation of abstractions
such as legal rules, constitutional, preconstitutional, or otherwise. 69 But it has
been shown more than once that this criticism was itself unrealistically incomplete, since it underestimated the extent to which people consciously or unconsciously behave according to abstract rules, whose authority goes largely
unquestioned.7 ° Indeed, all law involves the attempt to impose, in advance,
abstract, fairly orderly, and more or less general demands on what are other-

wise random, particular, and concrete instances of human conduct. 71
68. See J. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 4 (1976). It should be clear by now that the force

of a preconstitutional rule rests not on its "correctness" but on its acceptance. It has been argued, however,
that the society is, in fact, so fractionated regarding preferred values that no agreement could take place, not
even the evolving tacit agreement by officials which has been described. See Tushnet, Truth, Justice and the
American Way: An Interpretationof Public Law Scholarship in the Seventies, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1307, 1309-20
(1979); Levinson, The Specious Morality of the Law, HARPER'S, May 1977, at 38, 39-41. As indicated by the
distinction between constitutional and preconstitutional rules, the force of this essay has not been on the content
of the constitutional limitations but on the way those limits are identified. Obviously these are related. But it
does not follow from the differences among individuals concerning the proper substantive powers of the state
that a compromise rule cannot emerge at the more general level of preconstitutional rule. Indeed, every instance
of collaborative human endeavor argues otherwise.
Of course, the greater the substantive disagreement on moral issues, the more modest the substantive role
that can be assigned to government and the more closed the preconstitutional rule is likely to be. It is hard to
believe that there can be no agreement at all (in the sense discussed) on even such a limited government. At this
level of argument, proponents of a broader governmental role would seem likely to prefer limited government to
a breakdown of the consensus which makes any government at all possible. Although such a government may
still generate substantive outcomes that are disagreeable to some people, they may still reason (or intuit) that the
advantages of having some legal system outweigh its shortcomings. Any preconstitutional rule will, in this
limited area, displace individual moral judgments concerning operative rules of conduct. This fictional or
"specious" morality may underlie an effective and useful government. Of course as the realm of government
concern is expanded, the frequency and seriousness of the clashes between individual morality will increase and
the prospects of lasting agreement will diminish.
69. See J. FRANK. LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 140-49 (1963).
70. See H. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 134-37 (1961); Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the
Process of Decision, 79 U. PA. L. REV. 833 (1931).
71. The importance of the imposition of abstract order on experience as a feature of law, independent of
other instrumental characteristics, suggests that this aspect of law satisfies a basic human need for order and
definition. See Leff, Law and, 87 YALE L.J. 989 (1978). Cf. R. ARNHEIM, ENTROPY AND ART (1971); E.
GOMBRICH, THE SENSE OF ORDER 1-16 (1979).

OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL

[Vol. 42:187

Of course, unlike other rules of law which seek to control primary conduct, preconstitutional rules are unaccompanied by the expectation of specific sanction or reward, which may be indispensable to their effectiveness.
The extent to which we believe such rules to be effective is finally a matter
that can only be decided by reference to each person's own observation of
government, knowledge of human history, and intuition regarding human
nature. John Maynard Keynes thought economic and political theories have
profoundly influenced the course of human government:
Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to

be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some
defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling
their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back .... [S]oon
or late,
72
it is ideas, not vested interest which are dangerous for good or evil.

I do not believe the authority of legal rules has been less powerful.
But granting this, the second question remains. Can we be comfortable
with a legal system whose basis is controversial, even arbitrary, and whose
existence depends on passing off that basis as the embodiment of a categorical
moral truth? Having uncovered the fact that every theory ofjudicial review is
built on a foundation of sand, is there any alternative to "realist despair"? 73 It
may not be going too far to say that our enterprise of government limited by
law must rest, in the final analysis, on some kind of self-deception, or at least
on a standing refusal to inquire too deeply into the basic rationale of the
constitutional limits. 74 The preconstitutional rule must be the ultimate reference for constitutional adjudication, although it might appear foolish or even
pernicious when examined on its own merits against a general criterion of
political morality.75
Of course, it has been one of my main purposes in this essay to stress the
importance of exactly such external criticism of the preconstitutional rule.
Theoretical constitutional commentary, among other factors, can lead to
changes in that rule. But the fictional aspects of acceptance of the preconstitutional rule are ineradicable in any working system of constitutional government. This should not be thought remarkable. The pivotal place of abstract
and uncertain ideas in law is far from unusual. To submit to their force is
72. J. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 383-84 (1936).
73. See Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnataral Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229, 1249.
74. See Perry, Contested Concepts and Hard Cases, 88 ETHICS 20, 35 (1977) (possible utility ofjudges

holding mythical belief that there is a uniquely correct solution to every case). This is not to say that at a more
general level a judge might not consciously decide to subordinate his own moral convictions or preferences to
the preconstitutional rule. See Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision. 79 U. PA. L.
REV. 833, 844-45 (193 1). Such action may be appropriate in a rule-utilitarian sense. See Kay, Book Review, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 219 (1977).

75. In its extremely limited realm, therefore, the preconstitutional rule takes on the attributes of God as an
objective, unimpeachable source of right and wrong. See Left, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979

DUKE L.J. 1229, 1246-49. Naturally, however, no preconstitutional rule that is antagonistic to values which are
both important and widely shared will be able to survive. See T. MORAWETZ, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 26-27

(1980).
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neither futile nor demeaning. 76 Most of human history is nothing more than
the interaction of the physical facts of the world and the purposive and creative use of human intelligence. Wallace Stevens, for example, made a central
point in his work of the inseparability of reality and imagination in creating
human experience." In most every endeavor we must proceed on the basis of
manufactured assumptions that cannot be grounded in any unshakable truth.
Stevens summarized this necessity by saying that "final belief [m]ust be in a
fiction." 78 It is not a failing of the law that our constitutional government must
rest finally on a chosen fiction. In law and elsewhere, we attempt to shape the
unruly facts of the world and of our natures into such forms as will best serve
our own purposes. In that attempt we have no weapons, no tools, and no
constraints but the fallible products of our own minds.
76. Professor Gilmore has eloquently warned us that "'[the quest for the laws which will explain the riddle
of human behavior leads us not toward truth but toward the illusion of certainty, which is our curse." G.
GILMORE. THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 100 (1977). With respect to the behavior of judges, we may agree
that certainty is an "illusion" without conceding that it is a curse. In fact, the illusion of certainty may be a
precondition of effective law.
77. See R. BLESSING, WALLACE STEVENS' WHOLE HARMONIUM 168-72 (1970). In one of his best
known poems Stevens sounded this theme clearly in describing a solitary singer walking along the shore at
twilight.
It was her voice that made
The sky acutest at its vanishing,
She measured to the hour its solitude,
She was the single artificer of the world
In which she sang. And when she sang, the sea,
Whatever self it had. became the self
That was her song, for she was the maker. Then we,
As we beheld her striding there alone,
Knew that there never was a world for her
Except the one she sang and, singing, made.
Stevens. The Idea of Orderat Key West, in THE PALM AT THE END OF THE MIND: SELECTED POEMS AND A

PLAY 98 (1971). 1 cannot believe it is entirely coincidental that Stevens was also a lawyer. S.WESTON,
WALLACE STEVENS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE POETRY 1 (1977).
Bernard Williams suggests that setting about on a project of acquiring a belief without regard to its truth
may in certain cases "not seem evidently incoherent" but it is "deeply irrational, and ... most of us would
have a very strong impulse against engaging in a project of this kind however uncomfortable these truths were
which we were living with." B. WILLIAMS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 150 (1973). See Wiggins, Freedom,
Knowledge, Belief and Causality, in KNOWLEDGE AND NECESSITY 144-45 (Vesey ed. 1970). The problem with
this kind of chosen belief is. at least in part, that preserving it. in the light of continuous clashes with contradictory reality will require a never-ending chain of new false beliefs that could tend to "total destruction of the
world of reality, to ...paranoia." B. WILLIAMIS, PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 151 (1973). But Mark Fisher has
pointed out there are. at least, some kinds of belief-belief in the hereafter, for example-which will not have to
confront these challenges from reality. See Fisher, Truth as a Problenifor Utilitarianism.89 MIND 249 (1980).
The authority of the preconstitutional rule may be such a case. Moreover, as should now be clear, the "truth" of
the force of a rule of law is what we want it to be. A preconstitutional rule is nothing more than a shared choice
of the officials of a government about the scope of that government's authority.
78. Stevens. Asides On the Oboe, in THE PALM AT THE END OF THE MIND: SELECTED POEMS AND A

PLAY 187 (1971).

